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ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS VIA EU BORDER REGULATIONS: 
INHIBITING ACCESS TO MEDICINE OR 
PREVENTING COUNTERFEIT MEDICINE? 
INTRODUCTION 
n May 5, 2009, German customs officials detained a shipment on its 
way from India to the Republic of Vanuatu1 containing over three 
million tablets of the essential medicine2 amoxicillin,3 a generic antibiot-
ic.4 The customs officials, acting under the authority of European Coun-
cil (“EC”) Regulation No. 1383/2003 (“EC Regulation”), suspended the 
transit of the generic pharmaceutical on suspicion that it infringed the 
intellectual property rights5 (“IPRs”) of the brand-name antibiotic, 
                                                                                                                       
 1. Vanuatu is a Least Developed Country (“LDC”) located in the South Pacific. See 
Vanuatu, UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 
LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, & SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES [UN-
OHRLLS] (June 2008), http://www.unohrlls.org/en/orphan/301/. LDCs are the “poorest 
and weakest segments of the international community. Extreme poverty, the structural 
weaknesses of their economies and the lack of capacities related to growth, often com-
pounded by structural handicaps, hamper efforts of these countries to improve the quality 
of life of their people.” Least Developed Countries: About LDCs, UN-OHRLLS, 
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
 2. Essential medicines are defined as “those that satisfy the priority health needs of 
the population.” WHO Essential Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en/index.html (last visited Jan. 
14, 2011); see also World Health Org., WHO Model List of Essential Medicines List 
(16th ed. Mar. 2010) [hereinafter WHO Essential Medicines List], available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/Updated_sixteenth_adult_
list_en.pdf. 
 3. Amoxicillin is an essential medicine used to treat a wide range of bacterial infec-
tions. See WHO Essential Medicines List, supra note 2, § 6.2.1; see also World Health 
Org., WHO Model List of Essential Medicines for Children, § 6.2.1 (2d ed. Mar. 2010), 
available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/Updated_second_children
_list_en.pdf. The amoxicillin shipment was worth approximately 28,000 Euros and con-
tained about 76,000 courses of treatment. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard, ¶ 126, 
IP/C/M/60 (June 8–9, 2009) [hereinafter June Minutes]. 
 4. See Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in Frankfurt Spark Fears of EU-Wide Pattern, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (June 5, 2009), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/06/05/drug-seizures-in-frankfurt-spark-fears-of-eu-wide-
pattern[hereinafter Mara, Drug Seizures in Frankfurt]. 
 5. The May 5, 2009 seizure was based on the suspicion that the generic pharmaceut-
ical infringed on the trademark rights of Amoxil; it did not involve any patent infringe-
ment. Id.; see also June Minutes, supra note 3, ¶ 141. 
O 
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Amoxil, owned by GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”).6 The customs officials 
contacted GSK, as required by the EC Regulation and after GSK con-
firmed that the amoxicillin consignment did not violate its rights, the cus-
toms officials released the shipment to its final destination.7 
The suspension, or seizure,8 of the amoxicillin shipment is a recent ac-
tion9 taken by a regional customs authority within the European Union 
(“EU”), in an effort to prevent suspected counterfeit medicines from be-
ing sold illegally in the EU market and to protect the IPRs of European 
pharmaceutical companies.10 On more than twenty occasions,11 in the 
past few years, German and Dutch customs officials have seized generic 
pharmaceutical products in transit through their ports, alleging the goods 
violated domestic patent, copyright, and trademark laws, or domestic 
anti-piracy or counterfeit laws.12 The majority of the seized goods were 
manufactured in and shipped from India, destined for developing nations, 
such as Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, and 
Nigeria.13 The duration of the detainment of the goods varied from a few 
weeks to over eight months.14 
                                                                                                                       
 6. See Mara, Drug Seizures in Frankfurt, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. The word “seizure” is used by Indian and Brazilian representatives and other 
developing nations, when discussing the suspension or temporary detainment in transit by 
European Community customs authorities of the generic pharmaceuticals. See June Mi-
nutes, supra note 3, ¶¶ 116, 125, 136. 
 9. See Kaitlin Mara, Generic Drug Delay Called “Systemic” Problem at TRIPS 
Council, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (June 9, 2009), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/06/09/generic-drug-delay-called-
%e2%80%9csystemic%e2%80%9d-problem-at-trips-council/ [hereinafter Mara, Generic 
Drug Delay]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. John Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU Trade Complaint, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 6, 2009, at B4. 
 12. For the year 2008, there were seventeen shipments detained under the authority of 
the EU Regulation. Of these, sixteen came from India and one came from China. The 
drugs were destined for Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, and 
Nigeria. They contained the following types of goods: cardiologic medicines, lifestyle 
medicines, AIDS inhibitors, medicines against dementia, and medicines against schizoph-
renia. See Letter from J. van der Vlist, Mgmt. Team Member for the Tax & Customs 
Admin. on behalf of the State Sec’y for Fin. of The Hague, to Sophie Bloemen, Health 
Action Int’l Eur. (May 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/7%20May%202009%20Dutch%20government%20res
ponse%20to%20Freedom%20of%20Information%20request%20(EN).pdf. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Miller & Anand, supra note 11. 
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In response to the seizures of their shipments of generic pharmaceuti-
cals, India, Brazil, and other developing nations15 raised the issue at the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Council on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) meeting on March 3, 2009,16 
and, again, at the June 8, 2009 meeting.17 They contended the medicines 
seized were legitimate generic pharmaceuticals, since they were not un-
der patent protection in the exporting and importing countries, and were 
not targeted for distribution in EU markets.18 Furthermore, by suspend-
ing and detaining the shipments in transit they argued the EU not only 
prevented the ability of the exporting and importing countries to trade 
freely,19 but they also prevented developing countries, even if only tem-
porarily, from access to essential medicines,20 which undermines the 
                                                                                                                       
 15. In addition to Brazil and India, the following nations expressed their concerns 
regarding the seizures of legitimate generic drugs by EU customs officials: Ecuador, 
Egypt (speaking on behalf of the African Group), Nigeria, China, Argentina, Cuba, Boli-
via, Venezuela, Tanzania (speaking on behalf of the LDC Group), and Indonesia. See 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting 
Held in the Centre William Rappard, ¶¶ 160–180, IP/C/M/59 (Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 
March Minutes]. 
 16. Id. ¶ 123. The specific seizure referred to at the March 3, 2009 WTO Council for 
TRIPS meeting regarded the December 4, 2008 seizure of 570 kilos of losartum potas-
sium by Dutch customs officials, which was en route from India to Brazil. Losartum po-
tassium is the “active pharmaceutical ingredient used in the production of medicines for 
arterial hypertension.” Id. ¶ 124. The shipment contained enough medicine to treat 
300,000 Brazilian patients for a full month suffering from hypertension. Id. ¶ 126. 
 17. Mara, Generic Drug Delay, supra note 9. India, Brazil, and developing nations 
raised the issue about generic drug seizures again at this meeting because of the May 5, 
2009 suspension of amoxicillin shipment by German customs officials. Id. 
 18. March Minutes, supra note 15, ¶¶ 131, 136. 
 19. India, Brazil, and the developing nations also argued that the suspensions violated 
Article V of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). Id. Article V states, 
in relevant part: “2. There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each con-
tracting party . . . 3. Any contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its 
territory be entered at the proper custom house, but, except in cases of failure to comply 
with applicable customs laws and regulation, such traffic coming from or going to the 
territory of other contracting parties shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or 
restrictions . . .” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. V(3). 
 20. In addition to the specific events mentioned, one of the most troubling suspen-
sions of generic pharmaceuticals for developing countries took place on November 12, 
2008. Dutch authorities seized a shipment of tablets of an anti-retroviral drug for 
HIV/AIDS treatment, destined for Nigeria. The tablets were suspected of violating the 
patent rights of GlaxoSmithKline and were deemed counterfeit. The drugs were suppo-
sedly paid for by the international governments supporting UNITAID and were to be 
distributed by the William J. Clinton Foundation. As a result of the suspension, it has 
been suggested that dozens of HIV patients have been placed at risk. See Kaitlin Mara 
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purpose of the public health dimension of the TRIPS Agreement21 and 
goes against the spirit of commitments made at the last round of WTO 
meetings.22 
At the WTO Council on TRIPS meetings, the EU reaffirmed its com-
mitment to “ensuring access to affordable medicines in developing coun-
tries,” and stated that its actions “against counterfeit and dangerous me-
dicines should not be at the expense of trade in genuine generic medi-
cines” among developing countries.23 The EU argued that the customs 
regulation protects developing countries by allowing for the control of 
counterfeit goods in transit and ensuring that measures are taken against 
global trade in products, such as fake medicines, that pose a dangerous 
threat to the public health of developing countries.24 In addition, it con-
tends the procedures used under the EU regulation are fully in accor-
dance with the TRIPS Agreement,25 which provides for temporary sus-
pension of goods.26 
The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associa-
tions27 (“EFPIA”) proffered support for the EU’s actions, stating that it 
                                                                                                                       
&William New, Concerns Continue Over Generic Drug Seizures as Legality Debates 
Begin, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/03/05/concerns-continue-over-generics-drug-seizures-as-legality-
debates-begin/; see also March Minutes, supra note 15, ¶ 129. 
 21. “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition and to promote the public inter-
est in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development . 
. .” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 8(1), Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see also March Minutes, supra note 
15, ¶ 132. 
 22. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health provides: 
“[W]e affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.” World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration 
of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration]. 
 23. June Minutes, supra note 3, ¶¶ 137–138. 
 24. Id. ¶ 143. The EU provided a recent example where their efforts, under the EU 
customs regulation, led to the detainment of a consignment of 600,000 fake and sub-
standard anti-malaria pills originating in India and destined for Togo. Id. ¶ 144. 
 25. Section 4 of the TRIPS Agreement is entitled “Special Requirement Related to 
Border Measures,” and provides requirements under which States are allowed to suspend 
the release of a shipment of goods, and establishes procedures for the temporary detain-
ment and timely release of the goods. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, arts. 51–60. 
 26. Id. 
 27. “EFPIA represents the pharmaceutical industry operating in Europe . . . [It] is the 
voice on the EU scene of 2,200 companies committed to researching, developing and 
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“recognizes the right of Member States to stop products that they suspect 
may be counterfeit from entering the supply chain.”28 However, the in-
dustry association also conveyed it was not the “policy nor practice of 
[the EFPIA] members to encourage Member States to use the power of 
detention available to them to prevent the flow of legitimate generic 
products.”29 Rather, it reaffirmed its commitment to improving access to 
medicines in developing countries and ensured that delays or detentions 
would not be extended for any longer than necessary.30 
Non-profit organizations, such as Health Action International Europe31 
(“HAI”), however, did not offer support for the EU.32 Instead, they chal-
lenged the intentions of the Member States, as well as the pharmaceutical 
companies, stating that the “actions of overzealous customs authorities 
mainly intended to protect the private rights and profits of [IP] rights 
holders.”33 Thereby siding with the developing nations, HAI and other 
non-profit organizations urged the EU and developed nations to modify 
regulations on border measures to ensure “developing countries are [not] 
being denied timely access to medicines.”34 
This debate highlights the competing interests at stake: the right of 
access to medicine versus the right of preventing trade in counterfeit 
                                                                                                                       
bringing patients new medicines that will improve health and the quality of life around 
the world.” About EFPIA: Who We Are, EUR. FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS 
[EFPIA], http://www.efpia.org/content/default.asp?PageID=319 (last visited Feb. 10, 
2011). 
 28. EFPIA Statement: Customs Seizures of In-Transit Medicines, EFPIA (Mar. 13, 
2009), http://www.efpia.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=6574 [hereinafter 
EFPIA Statement]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. EFPIA states that the pharmaceutical companies contribute to the goal of improv-
ing access to medicine in developing countries “through the supply of medicines and 
vaccines, via large-scale donation programs, preferential pricing and voluntary licensing, 
as well as through extensive participation in not-for-profit partnership activities.” Id. 
 31. “HAI works towards a world in which all people, especially the poor and margi-
nalized, are able to exercise their human right to health. HAI’s contribution is through 
advocating for increased access to essential medicines and improved rational use of me-
dicines. This is achieved through research excellence and the engagement of civil society 
in advocacy in the medicines policy debate.” HAI Global Network, HEALTH ACTION 
INT’L, http://www.haiweb.org/01_about_a.htm/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 32. “Another seizure of generic medicines destined for a developing country, this 
time in Frankfurt,” Press Release, Health Action Int’l, Another Seizure of Generic Medi-
cines Destined for a Developing Country, This Time in Frankfurt (June 5, 2009), availa-
ble at 
http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/5%20Jun%202009%20Press%20release%20Seizure%
20of%20generic%20medicines%20in%20Frankfurt.pdf [hereinafter HAI Press Release]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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medicine. These conflicting interests aid in formulating the arguments 
for favoring or opposing the enforcement of the EC Regulation to seize 
suspected illegal goods in transit. On one side, developing nations fear 
that the EU will extend its power under the EC Regulation to thwart 
trade in legitimate generic pharmaceuticals, preventing access to medi-
cine for those countries. The EU, on the other hand, does not view its 
actions as impeding legitimate trade or impacting access to medicine. 
Rather, it uses the EC Regulation to locate and destroy counterfeit medi-
cine, even if in transit, not only to safeguard its own population’s health, 
but also the populations of the destination country. 
To reconcile these opposing interests and views, it must first be deter-
mine whether the EC Regulation comports with the existing international 
agreements and whether it may be applied to goods in transit that are not 
destined for the EU market. Even at the domestic level, within the EU, 
the answer to this question is ambiguous. Recently, the High Court of 
Justice Chancery Division in London stated that the EC Regulation did 
not apply to goods in transit,35 while the District Court of The Hague, a 
year earlier, reached the opposite determination.36 As a result of this un-
certainty, India and other developing nations may initiate a formal com-
plaint with the WTO, in order to have the WTO’s dispute settlement 
body help mediate a resolution.37 
This Note attempts to contribute to a resolution by assessing the inter-
ests of the EU and developing nations, as well as exploring both the in-
ternational and domestic legal mechanisms regarding the suspension of 
goods in transit. Part I provides the necessary background by discussing 
the interests of pharmaceutical companies, developed and developing 
countries in protecting IPRs, increasing access to medicines, and pre-
venting the distribution of counterfeit medicines. Part II, first, reviews 
the relevant overarching international agreements, EC laws, and juri-
                                                                                                                       
 35. Nokia Corp. v. Her Majesty’s Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs, [2009] EWHC 
(Ch) 1903. 
 36. See Frank Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal: Acting Against Transit Goods Still Possi-
ble Under the Anti-Piracy Regulation in the Netherlands, LEGAL ISSUES IN INTELL. PROP. 
(2008), http://ipintelligence.howrey.com/isisvel-v-sosecali-acting-against-transit-goods-
still-possible-under-the-anti-piracy-regulation-in-the-netherlands-12-24-2008/ [hereinaf-
ter Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal] (discussing the Court of The Hague decision in Rech-
tbank’s Gravenhage [Court of The Hague], 18 juli 2008, IER 2008, 83 m.nt. J.G. Kuhl-
mann (Sosecal Inudstria E Comercio LTDA/ Societa Italiana Lo Sviluppo 
Dell’Eletronica) [Sosecal /Sisvel] (Neth.)). An unofficial version of the Sisvel v. Sosecal 
decision in English is available as a hyperlink from Geert Thuews, ECJ to Decide on 
Manufacturing Fiction, EPLAW PATENT BLOG (Dec. 20, 2009), 
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/sisvel/. 
 37. See Miller & Anand, supra note 11. 
2011]ENFORCING I.P. RIGHTS VIA EU BORDER REGULATIONS 723 
sprudence. It then analyzes whether the EC Regulation violates the 
TRIPS Agreement. Ultimately, this Note proposes that if the WTO must 
settle this dispute, it should render the EC Regulation in violation of the 
TRIPS Agreement only when customs authorities seize goods in transit, 
which do not have the potential of entering the market of the country of 
transit. Additionally, the Note recommends that the EU further clarify its 
regulation to ensure this result, and that the TRIPS Agreement should 
also be revised accordingly to help reduce any further uncertainties. 
I. BALANCING STATE INTERESTS 
A. Protecting Intellectual Property Rights 
The overall purpose of intellectual property rights (specifically patents) 
is to encourage innovation and promote scientific development,38 by 
granting inventors the exclusive right to prevent others from making, 
using, or selling their inventions for a limited period of time.39 This right 
gives inventors a temporary monopoly on the inventions that qualify for 
a patent under a domestic intellectual property regime.40 That is to say, in 
a country where a new product is protected by a patent, the consent of 
the inventor, or patentee, is required before another individual is legally 
allowed to manufacture, sell, or use the product within the country.41 
The current international patent system, as outlined in the TRIPS 
Agreement, has applied this rule globally to all members of the WTO, 
requiring individuals within member countries to either acquire a license 
for a product from the patentee before the product can be made or used 
within a country, or purchase the product at a price determined by the 
patent holder.42 For some WTO members, mostly least-developed coun-
                                                                                                                       
 38. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 39. Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement states in pertinent part: “A patent shall confer 
on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a 
product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, 
using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes that product.” TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 21, art. 28(1)(a); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2007) (“Except as 
otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any pa-
tented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefore, in-
fringes the patent.”). 
 40. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 28(1)(a). 
 41. Id. 
 42. P. Roffe et al., From Paris to Doha: The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 9, 10 (Roffe et al. eds., 2006). 
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tries (“LDCs”)43 and developing countries, this requirement results in a 
reduced accessibility to essential medications, because those countries 
are unable to afford the fees associated with the license or purchase of 
the medications.44 Pharmaceutical companies and developed nations, 
however, support a strong patent regime believing it necessary in order to 
recover research and development (“R&D”) expenditures and to sustain 
the business of discovering and developing new drugs.45 The TRIPS 
Agreement was an attempt, by the WTO, to balance the competing inter-
ests of developed and third world nations, by establishing a minimum set 
of standards to protect IPRs while allowing flexibilities for developing 
nations.46 
Historically, competing economic interests and conflicts have sur-
rounded the formation and enforcement of patent systems.47 In Europe, 
during the nineteenth century, the presence of a major anti-patent senti-
ment, which opposed the use of patents for monopolies as a barrier to 
free trade, threatened the existence of the patent system in many Euro-
pean countries.48 For example, the Prussian government sought to ab-
olish all tariffs related to patent monopolies in order to promote free 
trade throughout the German territories.49 Patents, at that time, were seen 
as preventing international free trade by directly restricting the activities 
and commercial interests of industrialists and inventors.50 Advocates of 
patent systems,51 however, prevailed because of the need for industrializ-
                                                                                                                       
 43. See Least Developed Countries: About LDCs, supra note 1. 
 44. Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicine in 2005 and Beyond, in 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 41, 41(Roffe 
et al. eds., 2006). “For developing countries, the TRIPS standards are usually higher than 
their previous standards . . . This will delay the marketing of generic versions of new 
drugs, and thus, the competition they entail. As a result, access to medicine is bound to 
become further compromised.” Id. 
 45. Roffe et al., supra note 42, at 12. 
 46. HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE 48 (2007). 
 47. TSHIMANGA KONGOLO, UNSETTLED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ISSUES xxi (2008). 
 48. For example, in Switzerland, “the legislature in December 1863 renewed its op-
position to the patent system with a reference to the fact that ‘political economists of 
greatest competence’ had declared that the principle of patent protection was ‘pernicious 
and indefensible.’” Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nine-
teenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 5 (1950). 
 49. Id. at 4. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Proponents of the patent system came from unlikely individuals, such as Adam 
Smith, who normally promoted free trade and “condemned ‘exclusive privileges’ as 
‘greatly prejudicial to society.’” ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, 
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ing nations to encourage growth and stimulate their economies52 in re-
sponse to the decline in momentum of the free-trade movement during 
the late nineteenth century.53 Protection of IPRs, therefore, was probably 
viewed as important to the development of an industrialized global econ-
omy. 
At the same time, in 1883, the first multi-national intellectual property 
treaty, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(“Paris Convention”), was concluded.54 The treaty created substantive 
intellectual property protections for inventors outside of their native 
countries.55 It also provided flexibility for Member States in choosing the 
criteria for patentability, including the determination of which fields of 
industry should be subject to patent protection.56 A “general trend” in 
most developed and developing countries at the time “was to extend pro-
tection to processes and not products,” excluding medical drug prod-
ucts.57 To appease anti-patent supporters, the Paris Convention provided 
compulsory licenses,58 allowing a government to grant a third party the 
right to use the patent without the consent of the true patent holder, in 
                                                                                                                       
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (4th ed. 2007); see also Machlup & 
Penrose, supra note 48, at 7. However, regarding awarding patents, Adam Smith “argued 
that a temporary monopoly granted to an inventor of a new machine could be justified as 
a means of rewarding risk and expense.” Id. 
 52. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 51, at 6 (“Although the overall contribution of the 
patent system to the Industrial Revolution has been a matter of debate . . . , it seems no 
coincidence that the patent system matured alongside the early industrial technologies.”). 
 53. See WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE FREE TRADE 
MOVEMENT 1, 164 (2d. ed. 1905). 
 54. See Roffe et al., supra note 42, at 9. 
 55. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 51, at 55. Article 2 of the Paris Convention 
provides: “Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of indus-
trial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their re-
spective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the 
rights specially provided for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same 
protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their 
rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are complied 
with.” Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art.2, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 56. See Roffe et al., supra note 42, at 9. 
 57. Id. at 11. 
 58. See Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 5. “A compulsory license is an authori-
zation given by the government for the use by a third party, without the consent of the 
right-owner of a patent or other intellectual property right.” Carlos M. Correa, Pro-
Competitive Measures Under TRIPS to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing 
Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 40, 48 (Drahos & Mayne eds., 2002). 
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order to prevent abuses that could result from the exercise of the exclu-
sive rights of a patent holder.59 
As a result of the increased interdependence on global trade in the 
twentieth century,60 a need developed to create a stronger international 
intellectual property regime “to promote effective and adequate protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and pro-
cedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade.”61 The TRIPS Agreement, signed in 1994, 
made drastic changes to the intellectual property systems of developing 
countries, but not to the systems of developed nations, like the United 
States.62 The TRIPS Agreement established that patents “shall be availa-
ble for any invention, whether products or processes, in all fields of tech-
nology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable 
of industrial application.”63 Therefore, unlike the Paris Convention, the 
TRIPS Agreement extends patent protection to products, including 
pharmaceutical medicines.64 
In addition to proscribing the scope of IPRs in the international realm, 
the TRIPS Agreement provides important flexibilities for developing 
nations in order to “to address some aspects of the controversies about 
the impact of IP rights on innovation and creativity, abuse of dominant 
power and restrictive business practices.”65 The flexibilities included the 
freedom to define the scope of the patentability criteria, such as novelty 
                                                                                                                       
 59. See KONGOLO, supra note 47, at 6. 
 60. In the late twentieth century, “the international business community began to 
tackle the more ambitious project of harmonization, i.e., creating uniform substantive 
standards of intellectual property protection.” MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 51, at 57. 
“Moreover, world trade was becoming increasingly important to the economies of [the] 
United States and other industrialized nations. Markets in developing countries were no 
longer insignificant . . .” Id. 
 61. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 62. Under the TRIPS Agreement, all members of the WTO are obligated to include 
almost all important commercial fields within the scope of patentable subject matter—a 
major change for countries that had refused to enforce pharmaceutical patents on public 
health or access grounds; test patent applications for the presence of an “inventive step,” 
which is defined as synonymous with the US requirements of non-obviousness; include 
in the patentee’s rights the exclusive right to import the invention; and curtail the practice 
of granting compulsory licenses by requiring certain formal procedures. See TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 21, arts. 21, 27. 
 63. Id. art. 27(1). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng, The Development-Balance of the TRIPS Agreement 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: IS IT FAIR? 97, 109 (Malbon & Lawson eds., 2008). 
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or inventive step,66 the possibility of establishing exceptions to exclusive 
rights,67 and compulsory licensing.68 The TRIPS flexibilities were meant 
to provide an advantage for developing nations so “that their level of de-
velopment can benefit from the utilization of the flexibilities.”69 
The conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement intended not only to establish 
a minimum set of standards of IPRs for the international community, but 
it also attempted to create a balanced system by which developed and 
developing countries could eventually improve their domestic technolo-
gy base and economies.70 For developed countries, TRIPS provides secu-
rity for the global integrity of their domestic products by establishing 
procedures that ensure other countries will respect the IP protections sur-
rounding those products and prevent unfair competition.71 In theory, the 
flexibilities built into TRIPS allow developing countries to establish their 
own system for IPR protection as well as ensure access to products that 
benefit public health.72 In practice, however, the flexibilities contained 
within the TRIPS Agreement are difficult to implement in developing 
nations.73 
While developing nations can attempt to protect certain interests, such 
as public health, by excluding particular inventions from patentability, 
these actions are easily frustrated by other countries that do protect the 
offending invention.74 As such, the flexibilities under the TRIPS Agree-
ment are seriously affected by the nature of the IP laws in and the inter-
ests of the most industrious or innovative countries.75 For example, de-
veloping nations may only utilize compulsory licenses in a national 
emergency, for a public non-commercial use, or as a remedy to anti-
                                                                                                                       
 66. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 27(1). 
 67. Id. arts. 27(2), 27(3), 30. 
 68. Id. art. 31. 
 69. Biadgleng, supra note 65, at 109. 
 70. See Introduction, in INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: IS 
IT FAIR? 1, 4 (Malbon & Lawson eds., 2008). 
 71. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 3 (“Each Member shall accord to the 
nationals of other Members treatment no less [favorable] than that it accords to its own 
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property . . .”). 
 72. The TRIPS agreement includes some provisions that attempt to “strike a balance 
between the implementation of TRIPS and the level of development” in developing coun-
tries. Biadgleng, supra note 65, at 108. First, TRIPS provides a transition period for the 
implementation of the agreement. Id. It also “targets the need for flexibility to create 
viable technologies” by “prompting and encouraging technology transfer” for LDCs. Id. 
 73. See id. at 110. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Biadgleng, supra note 65, at 110. The purpose of the flexibilities “can be 
frustrated easily if another country decides to protect the offending invention.” Id. 
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competitive practices or a dependency on patents.76 However, developing 
nations that lack the manufacturing capacity to produce the necessary 
products under these licenses are not able to benefit from this flexibility, 
frustrating its overall purpose.77 Ultimately, these nations are forced “to 
acquire from the international market at higher prices the same . . . prod-
ucts they have excluded from patentability.”78 The flexibility of compul-
sory licensing faces further problems regarding implementation in that 
generic manufacturers do not have effective incentives to “engage in 
production of pharmaceuticals for export to developing countries.”79 
Thus, the difficulties of implementing TRIPS flexibilities reveal the ex-
tent to which developing countries remain dependent on the cooperation 
of technologically developed countries.80 
In the recent case of the temporarily seized shipment of amoxicillin, 
described at the beginning of this Note, developing countries argue that 
developed countries are not cooperative, but rather inhibiting legal ex-
changes of goods.81 In this case, the shipment of amoxicillin did not vi-
olate any IPRs within the EU. Furthermore, under the TRIPS flexibili-
ties, amoxicillin was not a protected product under the domestic IP sys-
tems of India or the Republic of Vanuatu; therefore, the countries were 
free to export and import this product.82 While the goods were eventually 
released by the German customs officials, that action, as well as other 
like seizures, and the difficulties of implementing TRIPS flexibilities, 
nonetheless raises a genuine concern that technologically developed 
countries will attempt to enforce more restrictive, unyielding IPRs.83 
Another recent cause for concern for developing countries is the use of 
free trade agreements by developed nations to negotiate and secure 
                                                                                                                       
 76. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 314–15 (2007); see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 31(b) (“[I]n the case of 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use” a Member can waive the requirement 
of obtaining “authorization from the right holder.”). 
 77. Biadgleng, supra note 65, at 110. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. June Minutes, supra note 3, ¶¶ 118–121. 
 82. Martin Khor, Row Over European Seizures of Low Cost Drugs, THIRD WORLD 
NETWORK (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends/gtrends262.htm; see 
also HAI Press Release, supra note 32 (“There is no valid reason for detaining these me-
dicines especially since the name ‘Amoxicillin’ is an international non-proprietary 
name.”). 
 83. See Mara, Generic Drug Delay, supra note 9. 
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stronger IP protections than established under the TRIPS Agreement.84 
These additional efforts by developed countries to protect their rights in 
intellectual property, in conjunction with the dependence of developing 
countries on others’ technologies and products, are underlying reasons 
why developing countries must advocate for their right of access to med-
icine. 
B. Ensuring Access to Medicine 
“The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of 
the fundamental rights of every human being.”85 It is argued that the 
right to health, which is a right enshrined in many international treaties 
and documents,86 includes a right of access to essential medicines.87 
Even though the health of all populations is an important international 
goal, the “availability of affordable essential medicines is still far from 
adequate.”88 Currently, governments in developing nations are only able 
to meet one third of their population’s medical needs via government 
sponsored initiatives.89 In addition, prices of medicines vary widely and 
                                                                                                                       
 84. See Graham Dutfield, Knowledge Diplomacy and the New Intellectual Property 
Fundamentalism, in INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: IS IT 
FAIR? 31, 31 (Malbon & Lawson eds., 2008). One of the most effective strategies being 
employed is that of so-called free-trade agreements containing highly constraining and 
protectionist ‘TRIPS Plus’ IP provisions that seem to be aimed to serve the interests of 
the developed world corporations. Id. “The FTA negotiations and FTAs themselves seem 
to be neither wholly free, since the IP Provisions in them are inherently protectionist, nor 
fair to the weaker negotiating parties. . . . They are popular with the United States gov-
ernment and the European Commission . . . because [they] . . . are the major producers 
and exporters of patent, copyright and trademark-protected goods and services, and there-
fore have much to gain from them. Id. 
 85. Constitution of the World Health Organization pmbl., July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution]. 
 86. The right to health has been asserted not only in the WHO Constitution, but also 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. See International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights art. 12(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III), art. 25(1) (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
 87. Access to Medicines—A Fundamental Element of the Right to Health, U.N. 
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Pages/AccessToMedicines.aspx (last vi-
sited Feb. 22, 2011); see also G.A. Res. 12/24, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/24 (Oct. 
12, 2009). 
 88. Press Release, MDG Gap Task Force, UN Report: Significant Progress in Debt 
Relief for Poorest Countries but Trade and Aid Still Major Barriers to Achieving Anti-
Poverty Goals, U.N. Press Release DPI/2517 C (Sept. 2008). 
 89. Id. 
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are higher than the suggested international reference prices, making it 
difficult for individuals in poorer nations to obtain essential medica-
tions.90 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic, in particular, brought to light the need for 
the international community to reassess the existing legal framework and 
priorities regarding access to essential medicines for developing na-
tions.91 When the compound azidothymidine (“AZT”) and subsequent 
method of treating HIV were discovered, the pharmaceutical company 
responsible for the discovery sought and received a patent.92 As a result, 
the company was able to “set the price for a drug that promised to be the 
only available life-saving therapy” for affected individuals.93 The price 
was set so high that HIV activists and developing nations used this deci-
sion to illustrate that “pharmaceutical patents result in higher prices thus 
reducing the accessibility of drugs.”94 Activists, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and even Congress challenged the pharmaceutical company 
and lobbied for a price reduction.95 For the remainder of the patent’s life, 
which eventually expired in 2005, litigation continued over its validity.96 
HIV/AIDS is only one of many ailments that dramatically affect the 
health of the populations of developing nations.97 Chronic diseases, car-
diovascular diseases, diabetes, and asthma are other ailments that afflict 
poorer populations, who not only have limited access to medicines due to 
cost, but also have inadequate health care systems to provide treatment 
and deliver medication.98 With the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement 
and the resulting “imposition of . . . minimum standards for patent pro-
tection,” public health advocates raised concerns that the TRIPS re-
quirements were not flexible enough to allow developing countries to 
access affordable medicines and technologies to meet their population’s 
                                                                                                                       
 90. Id. In order to purchase the “lowest-priced generic combination treatment regi-
men” for diabetes, in Ghana, a person would have to spend eight day’s worth of wages. 
MDG Gap Task Force, MDG Task Force Report 2009: Strengthening Global Partnership 
for Development in a Time of Crisis, 53, U.N. Sales No. E.09.I.8 (2009) [hereinafter 
MDG Report], available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_Gap_%20Task_Force_%20Report_2009.
pdf. 
 91. See HESTERMEYER, supra note 46, at 1–15; see also Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual 
Property and Human Rights: Learning to Live Together, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 20 (Torremans ed., 2008). 
 92. HESTERMEYER, supra note 46, at 4. 
 93. Id. at 5. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
 97. See MDG Report, supra note 90, at 53–55. 
 98. Id. 
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health needs.99 The flexibilities, in particular compulsory licensing, did 
not provide enough aid to developing nations that did not have the manu-
facturing capability to produce the medicines needed.100 In addition, de-
veloped nations along with pharmaceutical companies were not particu-
larly willing to implement these “flexibilities.”101 As a result, the global 
community decided to discuss and try to resolve the public health con-
cerns raised by the TRIPS Agreement.102 
On November 14, 2001, the World Trade Organization adopted the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, also known as 
the “Doha Declaration.”103 The declaration attempts to have all parties 
“recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many de-
veloping and least-developed countries,”104 and commit to implement the 
TRIPS Agreement in light of protecting public health and the promotion 
of access to medicines.105 In addition, it acknowledges that WTO Mem-
bers with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical 
sector could not make effective use of compulsory licenses, and that an 
“expeditious solution” was needed.106 The solution was slated to be 
completed by 2002; however, as a result of differences between the U.S. 
and the other WTO Member States, a solution was not finished until 
2003, and the TRIPS Agreement was not amended until 2005.107 
The solution includes a waiver of the limitation on exports imposed by 
the TRIPS Agreement, which “waives the obligation to grant a compul-
sory license . . . insofar as necessary for the production of a pharmaceuti-
cal product” as long as it is exported to an eligible importing Member 
State.108 To obtain this waiver, an LDC or developing nation must dem-
                                                                                                                       
 99. HESTERMEYER, supra note 46, at 76; see also Kumariah Balasubramaniam, Access 
to Medicines: Patents, Prices and Public Policy—Consumer Perspectives, in GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 90, 90 
(2002). 
 100. Roffe et al., supra note 42, at 18. 
 101. Id. at 16–17. In 1997, South Africa introduced an Act that “permitt[ed] parallel 
imports and compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. The US Government denounced 
the measures as an infringement of patent rights and the . . . [USTR] designated South 
Africa as a Special 301 ‘watch list’ country—a status that could lead to trade sanctions.” 
Id. Furthermore, even after the U.S. and South Africa resolved their dispute, thirty-nine 
international companies filed a suit against the South African department of health and 
Nelson Mandela. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Doha Declaration, supra note 22.  
 104. Id. ¶ 1. 
 105. See id. ¶ 4. 
 106. Id. ¶ 6. 
 107. HESTERMEYER, supra note 46, at 263–64. 
 108. Id. at 266. 
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onstrate to the Council for TRIPS that it does not have the capability to 
manufacture medicines.109 Once approved, patented pharmaceuticals 
may be imported into the country’s domestic market without a compul-
sory license.110 The nation exporting the goods, however, must obtain a 
compulsory license, in order to manufacture and sell the product to the 
authorized importing Member State.111 
The waiver received mixed reviews as a solution for increasing access 
to medicines.112 Some viewed the compromise, between developed and 
developing nations, as a success, proclaiming that the waiver “proves 
once and for all that the [WTO] can handle humanitarian as well as trade 
concerns.”113 Others, however, cautioned that the new framework needs 
to be used effectively and support must be given to developing nations to 
use the mechanisms available to fulfill their health needs.114 Further-
more, many activists contend that the solution is not sufficient because 
private parties can still block the export and import of pharmaceutical 
goods under their national laws.115 
These concerns are reflective of developing nations’ reservations re-
garding the recent seizures of pharmaceutical goods in transit. The de-
veloping nations argue that the seizures go against the object and purpose 
of the Doha Declaration,116 which is to implement the TRIPS Agreement 
to promote public health, not to impede it.117 The EU, however, states 
that it is committed to promoting public health, and that the seizures 
were not done to prevent access to medicine but to ensure protection 
from counterfeit medicines in its domestic market as well as globally.118  
                                                                                                                       
 109. Id. at 267. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Roffe et al., supra note 42, at 22–24. Some view the decision regarding the 
waiver as “an appropriate and balanced solution, responding to the concerns of both de-
veloping and developed nations.” Id. Other groups, however, have criticized the decision 
because of the procedural requirements, and the doubts they have regarding its economic 
viability and sustainability. Id. at 23. 
 113. Id. at 22–23. The proclamation was made by the WTO Director General. Id. at 22. 
 114. Id. at 23. Then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that 
“we must now ensure that developing countries are given the support they need to make 
use of the mechanisms that have been agreed, so that drugs reach the millions who are 
suffering and dying. This is a moral imperative.” Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. June Minutes, supra note 3, ¶¶ 131, 134. 
 117. See Doha Declaration, supra note 22, ¶ 4. 
 118. See June Minutes, supra note 3, ¶¶ 143–145. 
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C. Fighting Counterfeit Medicines 
A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently 
mislabeled [sic] with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting 
can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit prod-
ucts may include products with the correct ingredients or with the 
wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient (inade-
quate quantities of) active ingredient(s) or with fake packaging.119 
Counterfeit medicines pose a significant public health risk because the 
content of the drugs may lack necessary ingredients,120 or may contain 
insufficient quantities, or toxic substances.121 As a result, these products 
have the potential to be fatal, lead to drug-resistant pathogens, and place 
a significant economic burden on developing nations.122 Further, the risk 
of receiving undetected counterfeit medicines is greatest in those regions 
that lack efficient regulatory and enforcement systems.123 
In an effort to combat trade in counterfeit medicines, international or-
ganizations have formed task forces, and countries have passed legisla-
tion and negotiated multi-national treaties. In 2006, the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”) launched the International Medical Products An-
ti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (“IMPACT”), whose goal is to coordinate 
“across and between countries, in order to halt production, trading and 
selling of fake medicines . . . .”124 A recent example of IMPACT’s ef-
forts took place on May 29, 2009, when IMPACT, Egyptian police, cus-
toms, and private sector investigators worked together to seize “[ten] 
containers each holding hundreds of thousands of counterfeit medicines” 
                                                                                                                       
 119. What Are Counterfeiting Medicines?, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,  
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/faqs/03/en/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2011). 
 120. See WHO Fact Sheet: Counterfeit Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2011) [hereinafter WHO Fact Sheet] for an example from 2007, in which the product 
Xenical, an anti-obesity drug, sold via the Internet and imported into the United States, 
contained no active ingredient. 
 121. The WHO Fact Sheet for Counterfeit medicines lists a recent example of the im-
pact of a counterfeit medicine containing a toxic amount of an ingredient. See id. In 2009, 
a counterfeit anti-diabetic traditional medicine, in China, was found to contain six times 
the normal does of the compound glibenclaimide (which is used to lower blood sugar). 
Id. As a result, two people died and nine people were hospitalized. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. “Trade in counterfeit medicines is widespread and affects both developed and 
developing countries but is more prevalent in countries facing a variety of problems such 
as: weak drug regulatory control and enforcement . . .” IMPACT Activities, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/impact/activities/en/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
 124. About Us, WORLD HEALTH ORG. INT’L MED. PROD. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TASK 
FORCE (IMPACT), http://www.who.int/impact/about/en/ (last visited Feb. 18, 20011). 
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destined for the Middle East.125 The counterfeit medicine included life-
style products, and medications for organ-transplant patients, as well as 
patients with cancer, diabetes, heart disease, epilepsy and schizophre-
nia.126 Critics of IMPACT, however, are concerned that the underlying 
public health purpose will be “counterproductive and will create barriers 
to trade in and access to legitimate medicines.”127 They fear that 
IMPACT may misuse its enforcement power to further the developed 
nations’ intellectual property agenda.128 
Another international effort underway to fight counterfeit products is 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), for which negotia-
tions among several nations129 are still ongoing. The goal of the agree-
ment is to “establish international standards for enforcing [IPRs] in order 
to fight more efficiently the growing problem of counterfeiting and pira-
cy.”130 The agreement outlines a legal framework for the enforcement of 
IPRs, including a section pertaining to “Border Measures,” which autho-
rizes customs officials to suspend the “entry of goods suspected to in-
                                                                                                                       
 125. “Arrests and major seizure of counterfeit medicines across Egypt follow interna-
tional cooperation with INTERPOL and IMPACT stake-holders.” Arrests and Major 
Seizures of Counterfeit Medicines Across Egypt Follow International Co-Operation with 
INTERPOL and IMPACT Stake-Holders, INT’L CRIMINAL POLICE ORG. (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/news/2009/CounterfeitMedecine20090529.asp. 
 126. Id. 
 127. WHO Drops Counterfeit Drug Resolution Targeting Generic Products, ACTION 
FOR GLOBAL HEALTH (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://old.actionforglobalhealth.eu/news/who_drops_counterfeit_drug_resolution_targetin
g_generic_producers. IMPACT had proposed a draft counterfeit resolution that revised 
the definition of “counterfeit,” and opponents argued that the new definition would allow 
IMPACT and other organizations to seize goods suspected of trademark infringement as 
counterfeit. Id. The new definition would have expanded the definition of counterfeit to 
include trademark violations as well. Id. Thus, IMPACT would be used as a venue of 
enforcing certain IP rights, rather than inhibiting counterfeits. In the end, however, as a 
result of the critic’s concerns, the WHO did not pursue adopting the resolution. Id. 
 128. Id. Critics argue that the measures taken by IMPACT would result in entities 
refusing to conduct business with generic manufacturers, ultimately impacting access to 
medicine and the growing generic pharmaceutical industries negatively. Id. 
 129. The States involved in negotiations are the United States, Australia, Canada, the 
European Union (including its twenty-seven member states), Japan, Mexico, Morocco, 
New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 130. ACTA—Summary of Key Elements Under Discussion, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-
sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-discussion (last visited Feb. 
22, 2011). 
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fringe on [IPRs] at the border.”131 The scope of this section has not yet 
been determined, but it may apply to both goods being imported or ex-
ported from states and to goods in transit.132 
On a more domestic scale, the EU implemented and executed a pro-
gram called MEDI-FAKE, “which targeted customs control on illegal 
medicines entering the EU.”133 Customs officials seized more than 34 
million illegal medicines, including fake antibiotics, anti-cancer, and an-
ti-malaria pills, in a period of two months.134 
International organizations and national governments have invested 
their time in developing programs and negotiating treaties because coun-
terfeit medicines have a significant impact on a population’s health.135 
According to the WHO, “the prevalence of counterfeit medicines ranges 
from less than 1 percent of sales in developed countries, to over 10 per-
cent in developing countries. . . .”136 The complex trade routes of fake 
medicines, moving through several territories before reaching their final 
destination, increase the need for the EU and other nations, at both a lo-
cal and global scale, to take on measures to prevent these products from 
illegally re-entering their territories.137 
The outcomes of measures like IMPACT and MEDI-FAKE, in seizing 
large quantities of counterfeit medicines, may bolster, or even fully justi-
fy, the developed nations’ argument for the need to control medicines in 
transit. Despite the opposing arguments that these measures go beyond 
the standards allowed by TRIPS or the Doha Declaration, the WTO, in 
light of the severity and prevalence of counterfeit medicines throughout 
the world’s trade routes, may decide that the action of customs officials 
in seizing goods, either ex officio or by request of a rights holder, is per-
missible within the existing international legal framework. 
II. ENFORCING STATE INTERESTS 
In response to the seizures of generic medicines and in order to protect 
their state interests in ensuring fair trade, developing nations, specifically 
                                                                                                                       
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Customs: Millions of Illegal Medicines Stopped by 
MEDI-FAKE Action, (Dec. 16, 2008) (Press Release No. IP/08/1980). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See WHO Fact Sheet, supra note 120. 
 136. Counterfeit Medicines: An Update on Estimates, WORLD HEALTH ORG. INT’L 
MED. PROD. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TASK FORCE (IMPACT) (Nov. 15, 2006), 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/impact/TheNewEstimatesCounterfeit.
pdf. 
 137. June Minutes, supra note 3, ¶ 144. 
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India, may decide to file a trade complaint with the WTO against the 
EU,138 invoking the WTO’s dispute settlement process.139 The complaint 
will probably allege that “the European Union allowed big pharmaceuti-
cal companies to use the bloc’s tough patent laws to have national cus-
toms agencies [via the EC Regulation] detain generic drugs in transit to 
developing countries.”140 Most likely, India will focus on the potential 
violation of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration by the de-
veloped nations in restricting free trade and access to medicines.141 To 
bolster the strength of its complaint, India may look to recent decisions 
by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and EU national courts,142 
which addressed the application of the EC Regulation on goods in transit. 
The EU and developed nations, on the other hand, will try to support 
their actions with their legitimate state interests in protecting IPRs as 
well as preventing the distribution of counterfeit medicine. The remaind-
er of this section reviews the importance of the TRIPS Agreement and 
Doha Declaration and will examine the scope of the EC Regulation re-
garding the seizure of goods in transit. 
A. Relevance of the TRIPS Agreement & Doha Declaration 
By their very nature, intellectual property rights are restrictive on 
trade.143 Therefore, while an objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to 
“ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 
                                                                                                                       
 138. See Miller & Anand, supra note 11. 
 139. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 18. 
2011). The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade disputes is essential for enforcing rules 
and ensuring the free flow of trade between countries. Id. A dispute typically arises 
“when one country adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that one or more 
fellow-WTO members considers to breaking the WTO agreement.” Id. The first stage of 
the dispute settlement is consultation, which requires the disputing countries to try to 
come to an agreement between themselves. The second stage involves the appointment of 
a panel, which will help to make rulings or recommendations to help solve the dispute. 
Id. 
 140. See Miller & Anand, supra note 11. 
 141. As previously mentioned, India and developing nations took issue with the sei-
zures of generic medicine because they felt that the seizures compromised the spirit of the 
Doha Declaration, which was developed to promote access to medicine, as well as the 
TRIPS Agreement, which allows developing nations to establish their own IP laws. See 
March Minutes, supra note 15, ¶¶ 160–180. 
 142. See Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36; see also Nokia Corp. v. Her Ma-
jesty’s Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 1903. 
 143. IPRs are intended to grant the inventor a monopoly over his invention, therefore 
preventing others from manufacturing and selling that invention without the inventor’s 
consent, thus reducing trade. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 28(1)(a). 
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rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade,”144 in prac-
tice, this assurance is difficult to achieve. The tension between free trade 
and IPRs is also recognized in Article 8 of TRIPS, which recommends 
that Members States “adopt measures necessary to protect public health 
and nutrition,”145 and to “prevent practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology,”146 
while deciding on an intellectual property regime for their nation. The 
acknowledgment of the importance of maintaining free trade, especially 
in light of public health concerns, may support the more liberal interpre-
tation of the TRIPS Agreement advocated by developing nations. How-
ever, the overarching goal of the international agreement is to protect 
intellectual property rights and enforce those legitimate interests global-
ly.147 
The TRIPS Agreement attempts, in its provisions regarding both en-
forcement measures148 and border control measures,149 to include notions 
of free trade in order to mitigate the potential restrictions on trade inhe-
rent in enforcing IPRs internationally.150 For example, in its section on 
enforcement of IPRs, Article 41 requires that any enforcement measures 
adopted by Member States “shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid 
the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards 
against their abuse.”151 This part of the agreement establishes the general 
obligations of Member States in enforcing IPRs.152 This mandatory lan-
guage further demonstrates the significance placed on protecting against 
abuse by right-holders and the importance of protecting trade while en-
forcing IPRs. This provision helps developing countries speak out 
against the excessive actions of the EU, in light of the principles of fair 
trade embodied throughout the agreement. Also, since the agreement fo-
cuses on “legitimate trade,” India and other developing nations can fur-
ther argue that the EC Regulation was overly restrictive regarding the 
seizure of goods in transit because the goods were “legitimate” in both 
the importing and exporting nations. 
                                                                                                                       
 144. Id. pmbl. 
 145. Id. art. 8(1). 
 146. Id. art. 8(2). 
 147. The Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement states that the agreement “takes into ac-
count the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights.” Id. pmbl. 
 148. Id. art. 41. 
 149. Id. arts. 51–52. 
 150. See id. art. 41. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Article 41 is included in Part III: Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights; 
Section 1: General Obligations. Id. 
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The TRIPS Agreement, within its section on enforcement, also outlines 
specific requirements on border measures that both protect IPRs and 
guarantee freedom of trade. Article 51 establishes the obligation to allow 
an application to be lodged for suspension of the release into free circula-
tion of infringing goods by “a right holder, who has valid grounds for 
suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated copy-
right goods may take place.”153 This provision establishes minimally that 
customs authorities may seize goods, if directed by a right-holder, which 
are being imported into the country.154 Further, a footnote to the provi-
sion provides that a State is not under an obligation to apply these proce-
dures to goods in transit.155 Consequently, it is unclear whether a viola-
tion of the TRIPS Agreement results when a Member State stops alleged-
ly infringing goods in transit. In addition, the provision seems to be li-
mited only to copyright and trademark goods. A reason for this limitation 
may be that it is easier for customs authorities to discern “visibly infring-
ing” goods than to determine whether a good violates a particular patent 
claim.156 As a result, since TRIPS only establishes minimum require-
ments, border measures are optional when applied to other intellectual 
property rights, such as patents.157 Therefore, the EC Regulation, since it 
allows for border measures to apply to patents as well,158 has expanded 
upon the minimal requirements of TRIPS.159 
Under Article 52, customs authorities will seize goods if (1) there is a 
“prima facie infringement of an intellectual property right ‘under the 
laws of the country of importation,’” and (2) the right-holder provided a 
sufficient “detailed description of the goods” to enable authorities to 
identify the goods in question.160 An argument against the European sei-
zures and the EC Regulation can be found within this provision, since the 
                                                                                                                       
 153. Id. art. 51. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. art. 51 n.13. 
 156. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 
220–21 (1998). 
 157. Id. at 221. “WTO Members may apply border measures to any intellectual proper-
ty right [] and also to goods destined for exportation.” Id. 
 158. Council Regulation 1383/2003, Concerning Customs Action Against Goods Sus-
pected of Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights and the Measures to be Taken 
Against Goods that have Infringed Such Rights, art. 2(1)(c)(i), 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 [he-
reinafter EC Regulation]; see also infra Section II B. 
 159. Article 1 of TRIPS allows Member States to “implement in their law more exten-
sive protection than is required by this Agreement.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, 
art.1. Thus, in including patent infringement in the EC Regulation, the EC did not violate 
the TRIPS Agreement. 
 160. Id. art. 52.; see also GERVAIS, supra note 156, at 222. 
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agreement requires that the infringement occur “under the laws of the 
country of importation,” and does not specify that this includes the coun-
try of transit. Therefore, developing nations contend that goods in transit, 
even if they infringe under the laws of the country of transit, cannot be 
seized because the goods are legitimate and non-infringing under the 
laws of the destination country (or the importing country).161 If this ar-
gument is accepted by the WTO, then the action of EU customs authori-
ties in many cases will constitute a violation of Article 52 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
Developed nations, however, and in particular The Netherlands, have 
utilized a legal fiction of manufacturing in order to defeat this argu-
ment.162 Under this rationale, in order to establish infringement, goods in 
transit are regarded in the same manner as goods that have been pro-
duced in that country.163 Further, for states within the EU, the EC Regu-
lation applies to exported goods (i.e. goods made within the country) as 
well as to imported goods.164 As a result, if the goods in transit were eva-
luated as if made in the country of transit, and under those laws they in-
fringed on a domestic product, then customs authorities would have a 
legitimate reason to seize those goods. If the WTO were to interpret the 
TRIPS Agreement as including this legal fiction, then the strength of the 
arguments for developing countries would significantly deteriorate. 
Finally, developing nations may be able to persuade the WTO that the 
EC Regulation, utilized by the EU to seize goods, directly conflicts with 
the purpose of the Doha Declaration. The ministerial declaration states: 
[W]hile reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we reaf-
firm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and imple-
mented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ rights to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.165 
One of the goals of the declaration is to garner international support for 
the needs of developing nations, in particular for access to medicine, and 
                                                                                                                       
 161. See March Minutes, supra note 15, ¶¶ 131, 136. 
 162. The Netherlands applied this legal fiction in the Sosecal v. Sisvel case. Jens van 
der Brink, Comeback for the Legal Fiction of the Anti Piracy Regulation?, KENNEDY 
VAN DER LAAN (Aug. 2008), http://www.kvdl.nl/KVdL/en-
GB/_main/News/Newsletter/Newsletter+August+2008/Anti+Piracy+Regulation_IP/defau
lt.htm. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See EC Regulation, supra note 158, pmbl. The EC Regulation “lay[s] down 
measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, export, re-export or entry for suspen-
sive procedures of counterfeit and pirated goods.” Id. 
 165. Doha Declaration, supra note 22, ¶ 4. 
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to have Member States work together to find a solution to this prob-
lem.166 While the declaration may be more of an expression of interna-
tional commitment than the creation of binding international law,167 de-
veloping nations may be able to argue that they rely on this commitment 
in order to improve the quality of life for their own citizens. Further, 
since they are politically and economically weaker than other Member 
States, international commitments should be interpreted in a manner that 
ensures the welfare of developing nations.168 
B. Goods in Transit: Scope of EU Customs Regulation 1383/2003 
The regulation at issue in the dispute over the seizure of generic medi-
cines is the EC Customs Regulation 1383/2003.169 This regulation allows 
customs authorities, either on their own initiative (ex officio) or at the 
request of the right-holder, to detain goods suspected of infringing “cer-
tain intellectual property rights,” in order to enable the right-holders to 
initiate proceedings against these goods.170 With each revision to the 
regulation, the scope of the border control measures has gradually ex-
panded from “counterfeit goods, to pirated goods and . . . to goods sus-
pected of infringing certain [IPRs].”171 
The first regulation on border controls, Council Regulation 3842/86, 
enacted in January 1988, permitted trademark owners to request “the 
suspension of the release for free circulation of goods suspected of in-
fringing trademark rights.”172 The next revision, Council Regulation 
3295/94, enlarged the scope of protection to include copyrights, it intro-
duced the ex officio procedure, and mandated the detention of counter-
feited and pirated goods, in cases where the goods were imported, ex-
                                                                                                                       
 166. WTO Members had come to realize that a “compromise with developing country 
Members [was needed] to start a new negotiation round.” HESTERMEYER, supra note 46, 
at 256. 
 167. Id. at 279–80 (arguing that the Doha Declaration is considered a binding agree-
ment). 
 168. See Doha Declaration, supra note 22, ¶ 4. 
 169. See William New, Alarm Escalates Over Delayed Generic Drug Shipments as 
Action Sought, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/03/06/alarm-escalates-over-delayed-generic-drug-shipments-as-
action-sought/. 
 170. See EC Regulation, supra note 158. 
 171. Stephanie McAviney, Ever Broader Border Controls?, 4J. INTELL. PROP. L. & 
PRAC. 455, 455 (2009). 
 172. Id.; see also Council Regulation 3842/86, Laying Down Measures to Prohibit the 
Release for Free Circulation of Counterfeit Goods, 1986 O.J. (L 357) 1. 
2011]ENFORCING I.P. RIGHTS VIA EU BORDER REGULATIONS 741 
ported, re-exported, or entered for a suspensive procedure.173 Then, 
Council Regulation 3295/94, in 1999, amended the border control meas-
ures to include infringement of patents.174 Finally, in 2004, the EC im-
plemented Council Regulation 1383/2003, which “add[ed] plant variety 
rights, geographical indications, and designations of origin within the 
ambit of’ certain intellectual property.’”175 The evolution of the EC Reg-
ulation has had the ultimate effect of strengthening right-holders’ inter-
ests by broadening the IPR categories covered, facilitating the destruc-
tion of alleged infringing goods, and extending the scope for ex officio 
action by customs authorities. 
The recent seizures of generic pharmaceuticals have been executed un-
der the authority of Council Regulation 1383/2003 by regional customs 
officials, invoking Article 1176 of the regulation to justify seizing goods 
in transit, or by IP right-holders via customs officials, invoking Article 
2177 to validate the seizures by alleging patent or trademark infringement 
                                                                                                                       
 173. McAviney, supra note 171, at 455; see also Council Regulation 3295/94, Laying 
Down Measures to Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation, Export, Re-Export, or Entry 
for a Suspensive Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1994 O.J. (L 341) 18. 
 174. McAviney, supra note 171, at 455. 
 175. Id. 
 176. EC Regulation, supra note 158, art. 1. Article 1 states: 
1. This Regulation sets out the conditions for action by the customs authorities 
when goods are suspected of infringing an intellectual property right in the fol-
lowing situations: 
(a) when they are entered for release for free circulation, export or re-
export in accordance with Article 61 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs 
Code (3); 
(b) when they are found during checks on goods entering or leaving 
the Community customs territory in accordance with Articles 37 and 
183 of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92, placed under a suspensive pro-
cedure within the meaning of Article 84(1)(a) of that Regulation, in 
the process of being re-exported subject to notification under Article 
182(2) of that Regulation or placed in a free zone or free warehouse 
within the meaning of Article 166 of that Regulation. 
2. This Regulation also fixes the measures to be taken by the competent author-
ities when the goods referred to in paragraph 1 are found to infringe intellectual 
property rights. 
Id. 
 177. Id. art. 2. The relevant provision of Article 2 of the EC Regulation 1383/2003 
states: 
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within the Member State. Article 1 of the Council Regulation sets out the 
conditions for action by customs authorities when goods are suspected of 
infringing intellectual property rights.178 There are four conditions under 
which customs authorities may suspend or seize goods: (1)goods enter-
ing for free circulation179—goods imported into the State for sale on the 
market, (2) goods being exported180 and re-exported181, (3) goods found 
during check on goods entering or leaving the Community customs terri-
                                                                                                                       
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, “goods infringing an intellectual proper-
ty right” means: 
(a) “counterfeit goods,” namely: 
(i) goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a 
trademark identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of 
the same type of goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essen-
tial aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the 
trademark-holder’s rights under Community law, as provided for by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the 
Community trademark(5) or the law of the Member State in which 
the application for action by the customs authorities is made; 
(ii) any trademark symbol (including a logo, label, sticker, brochure, 
instructions for use or guarantee document bearing such a symbol), 
even if presented separately, on the same conditions as the goods re-
ferred to in point (i); 
(iii) packaging materials bearing the trademarks of counterfeit goods, 
presented separately, on the same conditions as the goods referred to 
in point (i); 
(b) “pirated goods,” namely goods which are or contain copies made 
without the consent of the holder of a copyright or related right or de-
sign right, regardless of whether it is registered in national law, or of 
a person authorized by the right-holder in the country of production 
in cases where the making of those copies would constitute an in-
fringement of that right under Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 
12 December 2001 on Community designs(6) or the law of the Mem-
ber State in which the application for customs action is made; 
(c) goods which, in the Member State in which the application for 
customs action is made, infringe: 
(i) a patent under that Member State’s law. 
 178. Id. art. 1. 
 179. Id. art. 1.1(a). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Re-exportation refers to the departure from the EC of non-Community goods 
introduced into the European territory without having been released for free circulation at 
any time. Id. 
2011]ENFORCING I.P. RIGHTS VIA EU BORDER REGULATIONS 743 
tory,182 and (4) goods found during checks on goods placed under a sus-
pensive procedure.183 For the seizure of generic pharmaceuticals, only 
the last category applies, since the goods were either under the “external 
transit” suspensive procedure184 or they were being transshipped—goods 
arrive in the EC with the sole purpose of changing means of transport—
at the time of seizure. 
Article 2 of the Council Regulation fixes the measures to be taken by 
the competent authorities when the goods are found to infringe intellec-
tual property rights.185 It establishes the meaning of “goods infringing an 
intellectual property right,” which includes goods infringing on patent 
and trademark rights under the laws of the Member State of transit.186 As 
a result, in deciding whether to seize goods in transit, customs authorities 
must confirm that the goods will infringe IPRs under the national law.187 
It is unclear, however, whether goods in transit, not destined for sale in 
the EU markets, can even infringe on IPRs within Member States of 
transit, since those rights are territorial. If not, then customs authorities 
will not be able to use IPR infringement, as stated in the EC Regulation, 
as a reason to seize goods in transit. In addition, developing nations will 
have a stronger argument against the seizure of generic pharmaceuticals 
that are being transported through the Members States of the EU prior to 
reaching the final destination. If the opposite determination is reached, 
however, then the Member States of the EU will have a legitimate basis, 
at least under their Community laws, to seize goods in transit. 
The ECJ and national courts within the EU recently addressed the issue 
of the legitimacy of seizing goods in transit.188 Specifically, the courts 
have examined (1) whether those goods are able to infringe IPRs in the 
Member State of transit, if the seized goods were not targeted for sale in 
the State, and (2) whether EC Regulation 1383/2003 applies to goods in 
transit.189 Unfortunately, the decisions of the courts conflict with one 
                                                                                                                       
 182. Id. art. 1.1(b). 
 183. Id. 
 184. External transit allows non-Community goods to move from one point to another 
within the EC customs, without such goods being subject to import duties or other 
charges. Council Regulation 2913/92, Establishing the Community Customs Code, art. 
91(1)(a), 1992 O.J. (L 302) 37. 
 185. EC Regulation, supra note 158, art. 2. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. art. 2(1)(c)(i). 
 188. See Case C-281/05, Montex Holdings Ltd v. Diesel SpA, 2006 E.C.R. I-10881 
[hereinafter Montex]; see also Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36; Nokia Corp. 
v. Her Majesty’s Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 1903. 
 189. See Montex, 2006 E.C.R. I-10881, ¶¶ 1, 9–11; see also Nokia, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 
1903, [1]; Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36. 
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another and do not provide a cohesive resolution to this problem. The 
following three cases highlight and provide insight into the important 
legal considerations surrounding this issue that the WTO could take into 
consideration when evaluating a potential trade complaint against the 
EU. 
1. Montex Holdings Ltd. v. Diesel SpA 
In Montex Holdings Ltd. v. Diesel SpA, on November 9, 2006, the ECJ 
reaffirmed and concluded that a trademark holder, under the Trademark 
Directive, can only prohibit the transit of goods through a Member State 
in which the trademark is protected if it can demonstrate that the goods 
in question are actually at risk of being on the market in that Member 
State of transit.190 On December 31, 2000, German customs officials 
seized a delivery of over five thousand pairs of pants bearing the “Di-
esel” mark on its way from Poland, where they were manufactured, to 
Ireland.191 Diesel argued that the garments infringed its trademark rights 
because of the danger that the goods could find their way onto the Ger-
man market.192 Montex, on the other hand, contended that the mere tran-
sit of the goods through Germany did not infringe any trademark 
rights.193 
The ECJ stated that the entitlements provided to proprietors by the 
Trademark Directive did not apply to goods in transit, but only to goods 
either being imported or exported from a Member State.194 The court 
further considered whether the transit of the goods was likely to damage 
the particular interests of Diesel as proprietor of the trademark in Ger-
many, regarding the essential function of the mark in guaranteeing to 
customers the origin of the goods.195 It determined that only acts of mar-
keting the goods are likely to infringe the proprietor’s rights in the State 
of transit.196 Therefore, in the absence of such acts, an infringement of 
the rights of the trademark holder could not be established.197 Further, 
“the mere risk that the goods could . . . theoretically be marketed fraudu-
lently in Germany [did] not by itself” prove that the essential functions of 
the trademark had been infringed.198 As a result, the ECJ concluded that 
                                                                                                                       
 190. Montex, 2006 E.C.R. I-10881, ¶ 46. 
 191. Id. ¶ 4. 
 192. Id. ¶ 5. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. ¶ 46. 
 195. Id. ¶ 24. 
 196. Id. ¶ 25. 
 197. Id. ¶ 25–28. 
 198. Id. ¶24. 
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Montex did not infringe Diesel’s trademarks, under the Trademark Di-
rective, since the goods were in transit through and not in free circulation 
in Germany.199 
The decision in Montex lends support to the interests of developing na-
tions who argue that their goods are merely in transit and therefore do 
not violate the intellectual property rights protected within the transit 
State. In light of this decision, the recent seizures of generic medications 
in transit by EU customs authorities may be violating the EC Regulation, 
as long as there is no evidence that those goods would be sold in the 
transit state. However, the following decision by the district court in the 
Netherlands may cast some doubt on this conclusion. 
2. Sisvel v. Sosecal 
On July 18, 2008, the President of the District Court of The Hague 
ruled in Sisvel v. Sosecal that the EC Regulation 1383/2003, which en-
titles IP holders to request customs authorities to detain infringing prod-
ucts that enter the European Union from outside of the EU, can be ap-
plied to goods in transit.200 The dispute between the parties arose when 
Dutch customs detained a shipment of MP4 players, acting on behalf of 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics, for the benefit of Sisvel, because the 
goods infringed upon the rights of the patent owner.201 The MP4 players 
were being transported from China to South America.202 In Sisvel, the 
opposition to the detainment argued that since the MP4 players were on-
ly in transit in The Netherlands and not destined for use in its market, 
customs officials could not intervene, in accordance with the decision in 
Montex.203 
The court, however, distinguished Montex by limiting that ruling, ex-
clusively, to the interpretation of the Trademark Directive, and chose not 
to expand the decision to goods detained in transit according to the EC 
Regulation’s patent infringement provisions.204 The court, in this case, 
applied the legal fiction of manufacturing, which assumes that the seized 
goods were manufactured in the Member State of transit and so have 
been released into free circulation and are thus on the market in that 
                                                                                                                       
 199. Id. ¶ 46. 
 200. Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36; Maria Pereira & Eva den Ouden, IP 
Enforcement and Goods in Transit: Recent Developments, EXECUTIVE VIEW (Mar. 18, 
2010), http://www.executiveview.com/knowledge_centre.php?id=11309. 
 201. Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.; see also Pereira & den Ouden, supra note 200. 
 204. Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36; Pereira & den Ouden, supra note 
200. 
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Member State.205 As a result, the goods in question infringed upon the 
patent rights of the proprietor in that Member State, since the goods were 
illegally competing in the market with the right holder’s product.206 
Therefore, under the EC Regulation, the goods were considered to be in 
violation of the regulation and subject to seizure.207 Furthermore, in 
reaching this decision, the court reasoned that it cannot be concluded that 
the ECJ wished to go back on its decision in Polo/Lauren, in which it 
ruled that the EC Regulation is to be interpreted as being applicable to 
goods in transit.208 
Thus, the decision in Sisvel suggests that in cases arising under the EC 
Regulation, at least in the Netherlands, courts will apply the legal manu-
facturing fiction, which in effect allows customs authorities to seize 
goods in transit as long as they infringe on an intellectual property right 
protected within the Member State. This result, however, was not 
adopted in a similar case recently decided in the United Kingdom. 
3. Nokia v. Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue & Customs 
(HMCRC) 
In July 2009, the United Kingdom High Court followed the decision of 
the Montex court and determined, in Nokia v. HMCRC, that goods in 
transit are not subject to the suspension procedures of the EC Regulation 
and do not infringe trademark rights , unless the goods are placed on the 
market.209 In July 2008, HMCRC stopped and inspected a consignment 
of goods being shipped from Hong Kong to Colombia.210 It consisted of 
approximately four hundred mobile telephone accessories, which were 
designated by the “NOKIA” trademark.211 HMCRC sent samples of the 
goods to Nokia.212 After investigating the samples, Nokia identified the 
goods as counterfeit213 and infringing under the Trademark Directive and 
requested that HMCRC seize the goods according to the EC Regula-
tion.214 HMCRC, after receiving legal advice, however, did not seize the 
goods, contending the goods could not be counterfeit within the meaning 
                                                                                                                       
 205. Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36; Pereira & den Ouden, supra note 
200. 
 206. Eijsvogels, Sisvel v. Sosecal, supra note 36. 
 207. Id. at 10–11. 
 208. van der Brink, supra note 162. 
 209. Nokia Corp. v. Her Majesty’s Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs, [2009] EWHC 
(Ch) 1903, [77]–[80]. 
 210. Id. ¶ 4. 
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. ¶ 5. 
 213. Id. ¶ 11. 
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of the EC Regulation unless there was evidence that the goods would be 
diverted onto the EU market.215 Nokia argued that HMCRC adopted an 
“unduly restrictive interpretation” of the EC Regulation, stating that it 
does apply to goods in transit.216 Also, Nokia argued that, in applying the 
EC Regulation, the legal fiction of manufacturing should be adopted.217 
The High Court did not adopt Nokia’s arguments, finding that in-
fringement of a registered trademark required goods to be placed on the 
market, and goods in transit and subject to suspension, do not, without 
more, satisfy this requirement.218 Further, the court distinguished the 
ECJ’s Polo/Lauren decision by contending that the court, in that case, 
only addressed the general question of whether the EC Regulation ap-
plied to goods in transit, and that it did not consider the more specific 
question, posed in the Nokia case, as to whether the definition of counter-
feit goods encompasses goods in transit when there is no threat of them 
being placed on the market in a Member State.219 Accordingly, the court 
reaffirmed Montex by concluding that the mere risk of goods being di-
verted into the market is not sufficient to justify a conclusion that the 
goods are in free circulation in the State of transit, and thus, infringing or 
counterfeit and subject to the suspension procedures of the EC Regula-
tion.220 
C. Analysis 
The WTO dispute settlement body, upon review of the cases, would 
have to decide on several issues. First, it would need to decide if the legal 
fiction of manufacturing should be applied to goods seized in transit. 
Then, it would need to determine whether the seizures of in-transit gener-
ic medicines, via the EC Regulation, are permissible under the current 
international law regime.  
For the first issue, the court in Nokia directly dismissed the idea of ap-
plying the legal fiction of manufacturing to goods in transit.221 The judge 
stated, in the context of trademarks, “it is not uncommon for the same 
mark to be owned and used quite legitimately by different proprietors in 
different territories in respect of the same goods.”222 He further stated 
that applying the legal fiction would produce a result that was “most un-
                                                                                                                       
 215. Id. ¶ 6. 
 216. Id. ¶ 38. 
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 218. See id. ¶¶ 49–51. 
 219. See id. ¶ 67. 
 220. See id. ¶¶ 77–80. 
 221. See id. ¶¶ 73–76. 
 222. Id. ¶ 76. 
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likely” intended by EC Regulation—the seizure of “goods lawfully made 
in one territory and intended for lawful use in another but transshipped 
through a Member State in which the mark was registered.”223 The WTO 
may be persuaded by this opinion, especially in light of Article 52 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. In that section of the agreement, a limitation is placed 
on the “suspension of goods,” so that goods may be seized if they are 
infringing under the “laws of the country of importation.”224 Developed 
nations, and the court in Sisvel, would try to persuade the WTO to interp-
ret “country of importation” as including the country of transit under the 
legal fiction theory. However, the plain meaning of the provision does 
not indicate that the country of transit is included within the meaning of 
country of importation. As a result, the WTO should not interpret the 
phrase as including the country of transit. 
Furthermore, an interpretation that applies the legal manufacturing fic-
tion to the TRIPS Agreement would go against the purpose of the TRIPS 
Agreement, itself, the Doha Declaration, and the principles of fair trade. 
The purpose of these constructs of international law is to not only ensure 
protection of IPRs, but to facilitate legitimate trade among nations. The 
legal fiction, while protecting IPRs in a way, actually inhibits and places 
obstacles in the pathway of trade in the international arena. For one, the 
legal fiction will render goods illegal that were legitimate in their country 
of origin and destination country.225 It will also force developing nations, 
and perhaps some developed nations, to redirect their trading routes, so 
as not to transship goods through countries that apply the legal fiction to 
goods in transit—thereby decreasing trade relations between countries. 
Furthermore, in light of the Doha Declaration, the TRIPS Agreement is 
supposed to be interpreted so as to protect the public health and ensure 
access to medicine.226 If this recommendation is adhered to, then Article 
52 should be read to not allow the country of transit to suspend goods by 
applying the legal fiction. 
If the WTO determines that the TRIPS Agreement does not include the 
country of transit in Article 52, it must then determine whether the EC 
Regulation complies with the TRIPS Agreement. In both Nokia and 
Montex the courts decided that goods in transit could not be seized unless 
there was a significant risk of the goods entering the European market.227 
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The mere threat of a risk was not sufficient in the courts’ view to allow 
for the seizure of goods in transit.228 The rationale behind these decisions 
should be adopted by the WTO as well, since it follows the reasoning 
and purpose behind enforcing IPRs. IPRs were developed, in part, to give 
inventors a monopoly over their idea, invention, or brand for a limited 
period of time.229 The goal, therefore, was to prevent unfair competition 
within certain protected markets. If goods in transit do not have the po-
tential to enter a protected market, then unfair competition in that market 
can never result and infringement of the patent, trademark, or copyright 
at issue cannot occur in that country. By adopting this reasoning, the 
WTO would acknowledge that the EC Regulation should only be applied 
to goods in transit that have the potential for seeping into the European 
marketplace. For actions taken by the EU, where there is little to no evi-
dence that goods will be placed on the market in the country of transit, 
and thus, not infringe on the IPRs under national law, the WTO should 
categorize those actions as violating the TRIPS Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite efforts made over the past few years to improve access to es-
sential medicines, developing nations are still far from meeting the medi-
cal needs of their populations. The recent drug seizures are an illustration 
of one of the many reasons for the deficiency in public health in those 
countries, including inadequate domestic health care networks and po-
verty. Measures such as the Doha Declaration and the TRIPS Agreement 
are a necessary start to the continuing dialogue concerning access to 
medicine and public health in developing nations. 
Regardless of the accusations made, the EU and EFPIA have stated 
that they support access to medicine for developing nations, and they are 
committed to the object and purpose of the Doha Declaration and the 
TRIPS Agreement.230 The seizures, on their part, were not executed to 
prevent access, but rather to protect against counterfeit medicine, which 
is also a significant problem for developing nations.231 In light of the de-
cisions of the ECJ, the EU does not seem to have the authority to stop 
goods in transit even if those goods are counterfeit and harmful to public 
health. As a result, there is a need to balance these two concerns—access 
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and counterfeit medicines—in order for developing nations to achieve a 
higher level of health. 
One attempt at a balance may be to revise the EC Regulation to affirm 
that it does not impede legitimate drugs transiting through European cus-
toms. It needs to ensure that the domestic laws of the country in transit 
do not apply to those goods, when raising IPR violations. If goods are 
counterfeit, then the goods should not be seized as violations of patent 
rights or trademark rights, but under another standard that does not pro-
hibit legitimate trade and requires customs authorities to provide evi-
dence of the goods being counterfeit. Another attempt to reach a balance 
may be to broaden the permissions of compulsory licenses to health 
needs that are significant, but may not meet the emergency standard un-
der the current TRIPS Agreement. 
Regardless of how international laws are modified, the populations of 
these countries are looking to the international community for some type 
of solution, to work together and compromise for the benefit of global 
health. In this instance, oral and written commitments are not sufficient, 
and the international community should demand change via State’s ac-
tions. 
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